This paper provides a new justification for the coexistence of formal and informal reciprocal loans in developing countries. We develop an investment model capable of comparing the financing costs of different financing alternatives. Notably, the reciprocal feature of interest-free loans from friends imposes an agnostic obligation on the borrower and generates implicit financing costs. The diverse financing outcomes hinge on the comparison of the explicit costs of formal loans and the implicit costs of reciprocal loans from friends.
Introduction
The empirical literature has extensively documented the coexistence of formal and informal finance in developing countries [1] . Formal finance refers to collateralized loans from banks, credit cooperatives and government agencies, whereas typically informal finance includes loans from moneylenders without collateral requirements but relatively high interest charges and small collateral-free and interest-free loans from friends or relatives.
Theoretical explanations of the coexistence of formal and informal finance have taken two distinctive approaches. One assumes that poorer borrowers only have recourse to informal lenders with access to institutional credit who then relend to them [2] [3] . The other emphasizes the screening difficulty and lim- trigger constrained borrowers to turn to informal sectors for additional credit [4] [5].
The above explanations can explain the coexistence of formal and informal loans from money lenders to a certain extent, but they face challenges in explaining the coexistence of formal loans and reciprocal loans from friends. First, both arguments potentially assume that formal finance is the first financing choice. However, there is no reason to deny that informal finance could be preferred. Second, the first argument justifies the coexistence of formal and informal loans by arguing that the use of informal finance from money lenders is borrowers' last resort, given that they are unable to access cheaper formal finance. Yet, reciprocal loans from friends entail neither the provision of collateral nor interest payments. Thus, the above argument is not convincing in explaining the coexistence of formal loans and reciprocal loans from friends. Third, viewing informal loans as spillovers from formal loans goes against the empirical evidence from the credit market in that despite the increased injection of formal credit, the demand for formal loans is still low in India [6] and reciprocal loans from friends continue to dominate the credit market in developing countries, such as China [7] . Reciprocal loans from friends are by no means an overflow from formal finance.
This note supplements the literature by providing a new justification for the coexistence of formal and reciprocal loans from friends in developing countries.
We develop a general model of investment and apply it to the cases of formal and reciprocal loans to determine when it is economical to use, either separately or together. Notably, the reciprocal feature of interest-free loans from friends imposes an agnostic obligation on the borrower and generates implicit financing costs. The final financing outcome hinges on the agent's complete evaluation and comparison of the aggregated financing costs from all available financing alternatives.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we develop an investment model composed of two types of investment, and the condition for the agent to undertake such investment. In Section 3, we specify two sources of financing and potential financing costs that correspond with each type of financing source. We analyze possible financing outcomes by comparing financing costs from different financing channels in Section 4. Section 5 concludes it.
Investment Model
The primary assumptions of our investment model include: 1) Agents (or borrowers) are profit maximizers and they differ in terms of the endowed assets (A) that can be committed as collateral to secure loans. 2) Agents allocate internal capital (K) between two activities: a self-financing conservative investment and a higher return but riskier investment with the aid of external credit.
3) The condition for agents to undertake an investment is the expected income of the investment is greater or equal to their reservation revenue. 
Re-arranging Equation (1), we get
It is possible that the agent's loan application will be rejected by financial providers with a probability ( δ ), which entails another type of risk premium ( 2
RP )
for risk-averse agents. A successful loan application enables the agent to undertake the riskier investment; on the other hand, loan rejection will induce the agent to revert to the conservative investment. Concomitant with the sunk fixed application fees ( f C ), the expected income levels for the approved loan ( )
Concerning uncertainties in the loan application, the agent chooses the riskier investment conditional on:
Defining the agent's expected return as ( ) (
and rearranging the terms in Equation (4), we obtain:
The summation of the right-hand terms is the reservation revenue ( γ ) composed of conservative return (q), risk premium associated with investment uncertainly ( 1 RP ), and financing costs ( ( )
) for the agent to undertake the riskier investment. As the expected return will be the same whether the external financing is from formal or informal reciprocal loans, financing outcomes with lower costs imply lower reservation revenue and greater potential profit for the agent. 
Financing Channels
Given the investment decision, we further assume that agents face two types of external financing sources. One is formal loans from financial institutions, such as loans from commercial banks or government financial institutions, the other is informal reciprocal loans amongst friends without interest charges. Agents prefer cheaper financing sources when they require external financing.
Our discussion of financing channels focuses on formal loans and interest-free loans from friends or a combination of the two 
When the borrower proposes a larger loan size and the lender considers the borrower to be riskier, the borrower is more likely to be rejected
On the other hand, the more securable assets offered and the stronger financial capacity of the formal lender ( F µ ), the more likely it is that the loan will be approved ( 0, 0
The use of the formal loan incurs a fixed application fee ( result, this implicit costs may discourage the borrower from using the interest free loans from friends. As a larger loan size and better opportunity costs of 1 Loans from money lenders are not considered for two reasons: i) such loans are considered unfair by policymakers, who argue that money lenders take advantage of their position to exploit poor borrowers and thus they are prohibited in some countries, such as China; ii) it is widely recognized that loans from money lenders are more expensive than formal loans. Theoretical Economics Letters The implicit obligation involved in reciprocal loans is also critical to the lender, who may be entirely unclear concerning the exact form of this future obligation, other than the repayment of the principal (
I B
. Nonetheless, such future obligation must be balanced with the opportunity cost of capital ( O ) in the lender's cost-benefit analysis so that the lender can make decisions on the loan.
We assume the rejection probability of reciprocal loan to be 
The lack of collateral in reciprocal loans does not discourage the agent from fulfilling his obligation, as the social enforcement imposed by close-knit communities will sanction defaulters by putting them in an isolated position, both economically and emotionally. To avoid such punishment, the borrower is incentivized to repay the principal (
) and compensate the creditor through "generalized reciprocity", such as providing free labour, land, or draft animal services, a direct transfer in cash or in kind, or a future loan.
Summarizing, the reservation revenues for the riskier investment through formal ( given the expected income is larger than reservation revenue.
Financing Outcomes
The agent's financing outcomes are closely linked to the loan size, which determines the financing alternatives available. Moreover, the loan size is also a key element affecting the lender's decision. In line with empirical practice in the credit market, we categorize the loans into small versus large loans. Small loans information between the borrower and formal financial agencies leads formal lenders to be more conservative ( ϕ ) concerning such loans. Therefore, the probability of formal loan rejection tends to be higher (or equivalent to) than Theoretical Economics Letters , the borrower will resort to formal lenders rather than the reciprocal loan.
For large loans, as the large credit demand cannot be fulfilled by an individual informal lender (
, the probability of loan rejection is high ( 1
which inflates the financing costs for informal reciprocal lenders (
Therefore, borrowers in the credit market tend to opt for a formal lender, resort to multiple reciprocal lenders, or use mixed finance for their large credit needs.
Assuming that all lenders make their lending decisions independently, the explicit and implicit financing costs of each financing channel could be assessed in the same way as for small loans. Summing up the financing costs for each financing channel, the borrower can compare the aggregated financing costs of each possible financing alternative and choose the favourable option.
Conclusions
This note provides a justification for the coexistence of formal and reciprocal loans in developing countries. We develop an investment model capable of com- , the agent will choose the formal loan. Theoretical Economics Letters evaluate the reciprocal obligation with higher costs, they may forgo the seemingly cheaper informal loans and undertake the formal loans with interest charges. One limitation of our paper is that current data do not allow us to empirically compare financing costs from each financing source, which certainly deserves a further study when more detailed data are available.
